IT is universally accepted that discrimination based solely on the
grounds specified in the Bill of Rights (s. 42) is altogether irrational
and is, therefore, not reasonably justifiable in a constitutional
democracy. Rationale for requiring conformance with the principles of
justice, social justice and equality in the administration of
government. Professor Lord Bryce has articulated the place of equality
as a pre-supposition (though not a constitutive element) of democracy.
“Democracy”, he writes in his book, Modern Democracies, vol 2
(1920), page 674, “is supposed to be the product and the guardian both
of Equality and Liberty, being so consecrated by its relationship to
both these precious possessions as to be almost above criticism..”
The importance of justice in human society is perhaps best
illustrated by considering the feelings aroused in us by injustice.
Whereas justice is a cold virtue that evokes no feeling, injustice or
unfairness arouses intense fury in us, as we get heated up and indignant
about it. “Indignation, which is the conceptually appropriate response
to injustice, expresses, as its etymology shows, a sense of not being
regarded as worthy of consideration. Injustice betokens an absence of
respect, and manifests a lack of concern.” Lucas, On Justice (1980),
p.7. For this reason, the occurrence of injustice, especially if it is
on a wide scale, immediately puts the “unity and coherence of society
under strain.” Lucas, op. cit., p. 4
Justice is thus rightly regarded as the “bond of society,” Lucas, op.
cit., p. 18, the “cornerstone of human togetherness.” Oputa, Lecture on
Justice. It is the condition in which the individual can feel able “to
identify with society, feel at one with it, and accept its rulings.”
Lucas, op. cit., p. 1. An unjust society cannot maintain its unity and
cohesion, because it cannot arouse in its members a strong enough
feeling of loyalty and allegiance. Injustice not only alienates the
individual’s loyalty, what is worse, it also arouses him to
disaffection. An individual, denied recognition by society, cannot but
feel alienated and disaffected. “Justice,” wrote James Madison, “is not
only the end of government, it is the end of civil society. It ever has
been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained or until liberty be
lost in the pursuit.” James Madison, The Federalist, No. 25, ed. Clinton
Rositer (1961). Unjust action by the state as between the racial,
ethnic and religious groups comprised in it (i.e. the state) is of far
greater concern.
Greater concern
This is because of its tendency to generate greater bitter resentment
and to provoke more violent social conflicts than unjust treatment of
individuals. By concentrating in the North nearly 80 per cent of his 31
strategic appointments and by excluding the South-East completely, a
feeling of alienation, of not being wanted, may have been created on the
part of those so disadvantaged or excluded. A feeling of alienation may
grow into that of disaffection or disloyalty. But it is perhaps social
justice more than individual justice that bears more significantly upon
the maintenance of the unity and coherence of society.
As Honore has observed, “modern social and economic developments have
made it clear that individual justice….is only a partial and incomplete
form of justice.” This perhaps accounts for the shift in emphasis since
the 19th century from analysis of individual justice to that of social
justice.
The glaring injustice of the present-day economic order, both
domestic and international, the cry of the underprivileged for
protection and the demands of the individual on the state for welfare
services have compelled attention being increasingly focused on the need
and importance of social justice and away from issues of individual
justice that once dominated it, and which characterised the order of
society governed by classical liberalism.
The concept of social justice has indeed conquered the public
imagination. “Almost every claim for government action on behalf of
particular groups is advanced in its name, and if it can be made to
appear that a certain measure is demanded by social justice, opposition
to it will rapidly weaken. People may dispute whether or not the
particular measure is required by social justice, but that this is the
standard which ought to guide political action…..is hardly ever
questioned. In consequence, there are today probably no political
movements or politicians who do not readily appeal to ‘social justice’
in support of the particular measures which they advocate”: F.A. Hayek,
The Mirage of Social Justice (1976), p. 65.
Commands of the constitution requiring conformance with the
principle of equal treatment of citizens (or the principle of
non-discrimination) in the administration of government: Under
chapter 4 of our Constitution guaranteeing the fundamental rights of
persons, the state is enjoined not to violate or contravene the
fundamental rights of life, dignity of the human person, personal
liberty, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of
expression and the press, peaceful assembly and association and freedom
of movement.
The emphasis in the guarantee is on the word “every”, which means all
persons equally, regardless of their station in life or standing in
society, whether poor or rich, powerful or inconsequential, of lowly or
noble birth, etc. The basis of the guarantee is that the dignity and
sacredness of the human person entitle all persons to equal respect for
all those attributes that make up the human personality – life itself,
intellect and thought, conscience and feeling, movement and speech.
The examination herein focuses specially on section 42 prohibiting
discrimination between individuals on grounds considered unfair. It says
that a citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group,
place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, whether
expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in
the country or any executive or administrative action of government, be
subjected to disabilities or restrictions, or be accorded any privilege
or advantage which are not applied to citizens of Nigeria of other
communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religion or political
opinions if such disabilities, restrictions, privilege or advantage are
imposed or accorded by reason only that the individual affected is such
a person, (Sex was made a prohibited ground only since 1979.)
The words “restrictions” and “advantage” appearing in the provision
call for special notice. They are words of wide import, and carry the
scope of the provision far beyond what is implied by the words
“disabilities” and “privilege”. The latter are essentially terms of art.
Disability connotes “an incapacity for the full enjoyment of ordinary
legal rights”, while privilege implies something approximating to a
legal right, such, for instance, as the non-liability of members of the
National Assembly for words spoken during the proceedings of the
Assembly.
Social practice
The words “restrictions” and “advantage”, on the other hand, are not
so limited in their import. To come within the prohibition, however, a
restriction or advantage, equally as a disability or privilege, must
stem from some law or some executive or administrative action of
government. Discrimination based solely on some social practice, such as
the discriminatory rules or practices of social clubs or other wholly
private associations, is thus not within the ambit of the prohibition.
But law in the context of the provision seems to embrace legislation
as well as the common law, customary law and Islamic law. Accordingly,
any rules of the latter are unconstitutional and void to the extent that
they discriminate between citizens on any of the prohibited grounds.
The rules of Sharia law discriminating against non-Moslems are thus
impeachable as unconstitutional. Rationale for requiring conformance
with the principle of equal treatment of citizens (or the
non-discrimination principle) in the administration of government
The equal treatment of citizens by the state or freedom from unfair
discrimination guaranteed in section 42(1) of the Constitution is among
the rights that constitute the essence of the concept of human rights
because it rests upon our common humanity as living human beings, with a
body and a soul, the ability to breathe, think, speak, move about and
to act, and a capacity for emotions and sensations. Every human being
feels pain, anguish and happiness, and is endowed with a conscience that
enables him to judge between right and wrong, and to form beliefs, just
like everyone else.
Common human nature
The differences which undoubtedly exist between individuals because
of differences in physical, intellectual and will power – “rights,”
which, to quote Lord Bryce again, “nature has bestowed on some and
denied to others” James Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol. 1 (1920), p. 70,
are only differences of degree, which leave unaffected our basic common
human nature.
Because of our basic common human nature, all citizens have more or
less the same need for the security of their person and property, for
justice in their dispute with others, for peace and order, for
happiness, the good life and for welfare care generally, for obedience
to the laws on the part of all, and the protection of their basic human
rights.
The rationale for the state to treat all citizens equally arises
partly from our common humanity as human beings with the very same basic
need noted above, and partly from the need to avoid the incidence of
unfairness in the administration of government, except where such is
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
If the state is the product of a social contract, then, all citizens
should count equally in relation to it. In this view, a democratic state
is an organization in which the relationship of all members to it is on
equal terms, whether it pertains to the conferment of rights, the
imposition of obligations, the security of lives and property, the
administration of justice, the distribution of social amenities or the
exercise of legislative and executive power generally.
The actions of President Buhari since his assumption of office seem
to fly in the face of the necessity for equal treatment of citizens
regardless of differences in ethnicity and in their religious and
political affiliations , and of the compelling rationale for the
principle of equal treatment as articulated above.
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